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THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES

INTRODUCTION

During the survey period, September 1994 through September 1995, the Tenth
Circuit decided eleven noteworthy cases involving sentencing in federal courts.
In each of these decisions, the Tenth Circuit addressed issues of first impression involving the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines).' This
Survey contains nine sections.
Part I provides a brief background and history of the Guidelines. Part II
discusses the Guidelines application. The remaining Parts (III through IV) survey Tenth Circuit decisions on the following sentencing guideline issues: (1)
what conduct a sentencing court may review in making sentencing determinations; (2) how a sentencing court should apply sentencing enhancements for
crimes involving "special skill" or "sophisticated means"; 2 (3) when the
Guidelines limit a sentencing court's discretion to impose a concurrent sentence prior to an undischarged prison term; 3 (4) whether a court must apply a
sentence consecutive to a state prison term when a defendant committed the
offense while on release or when a defendant used firearms, piercing ammunition, or explosives in committing the crime;4 (5) under what circumstances a
court should apply a sentence enhancement for an offender's misrepresentation
that she was acting on behalf of a charitable organization; 5 (6) whether the
commencement of trial precludes sentence reductions for substantial assistance; 6 and (7) whether placing a juvenile under the custody of the state Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services constitutes a "confinement" for
sentence reduction purposes.7
I. BACKGROUND

The United States Sentencing Commission (Commission)8 promulgated
the United States Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to the Sentence Reform Act

1. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.].
2. See U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.3, 2Tl.3(b)(2).
3. See U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.3(b)-(c).
4. See U.S.S.G. § 2.11.7 (Commission of an Offense While on Release); id. § 2K2.4 (Use of
Firearm, Armor-piercing Ammunition, or Explosive, During or in Relation to, Certain Crimes).
5. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A).
6. See U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b)(l)-(2).
7. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A).
8. "The United States Sentencing Commission ('Commission') is an independent agency in
the judicial branch composed of seven voting and two non-voting, ex officio members," three of
whom must be federal judges. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(l), intro, comment.; 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994).
The Commission is charged with "establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the federal
criminal justice system that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed Guidelines
prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes." U.S.S.G. Ch.1,
Pt.A(I), intro, comment.
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of 1984 (SRA). 9 The SRA charged the Commission to develop determinant
sentencing guidelines that further four "basic purposes of criminal punishment:
incapacitation, deterrence, just punishment, and rehabilitation."'"
The Guidelines represent the culmination of a reform movement aimed at
achieving honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing." Congress
sought honesty by curbing the broad sentencing discretion that accompanied
the previous indeterminate sentencing system. 2 That system resulted in the
imposition of indeterminate sentences, and allowed the parole commission to
determine the actual time served. 3 The Guidelines attain uniformity by embracing a "real-offense model" that bases punishment decisions on a
defendant's actual conduct rather than on the conviction offense. 4 This model attempts to curb sentencing disparity for "similarly situated offenders."' 5
Finally, Congress realized proportionality by establishing different sentences
for differently situated offenders according to the relative seriousness of their
conduct. 6
The Guidelines apply to all federal offenses committed on or after the
effective date of November 1, 1987.7 They employ a sophisticated array of
empirical, quasi-mathematical formulas for calculating sentences."8 With the
passage of the Guidelines, Congress abolished parole, thereby requiring that
convicts actually serve the sentences imposed by the court, less a permissible
good behavior reduction of approximately fifteen percent."

9. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, was passed as Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976, 1987-2040 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
10. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(2), intro, comment. (The Statutory Mission).
11. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(3), intro, comment. (p.s.) (The Basic Approach).
12. See id.; David A. Hoffman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Confrontation
Rights, 42 DUKE L.J. 382, 387-88 (1992); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 92-93 (1973) (criticizing the indeterminate sentencing system for its "rehabilitative" objective).
13. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(3), intro, comment. (p.s.).
14. For a general discussion about the choice to embrace a real-offense-based model as
opposed to a conviction-based scheme, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1988); Ilene H.
Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 883, 925-27 (1990). Through the real-offense mechanism, the Commission
sought to prevent prosecutors from "circumventing" the Guidelines by charge bargaining. See
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 278-79 (1989).
15. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(3), intro. comment. (p.s.).
16. Id.
17. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3372; U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(2), intro. comment. For an analysis of applying sentencing procedures to offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987, see James L. Slear, Project, Twentieth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 198990, 79 GEO. L.J. 591, 1162-71 (1991).
18. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(3), intro, comment. (p.s.); cf Note, An Argument for Confrontation
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (1992) (arguing that judges
retain discretion even under the Guidelines because Congress left intact informal procedures for
gathering "facts relevant to sentencing").
19. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(3), intro, comment. (p.s.).
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II.

APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES2"

The Guidelines consist of a sentencing scheme centered around a 258-cell
grid, or "Sentencing Table."'2 Each box contains the presumptive sentencing
range, also known as a "heartland": a "set of typical cases embodying the
conduct that each guideline describes. '22 The sentencing matrix consists of
two axes. An offender's offense level forms the vertical axis and ranges from
a low of one to a high of forty-three. 23 An offender's criminal history
forms
24
the horizontal axis and ranges in severity from category level I to VI.
Before calculating the applicable sentence under the Guidelines, a judge
must first determine the "sentencing range" using this sentencing matrix.25 To
determine the sentencing range, judges must: (1) establish the vertical axis;26
(2) establish the horizontal axis;27 and (3) plot the vertical and horizontal axis
lines on the sentencing matrix. 28 After determining the sentencing range,
judges have limited discretion to consider statutorily permissible departures
from the sentencing guideline matrix. 29 Federal law prohibits judges from
imposing prison terms that vary from the sentencing guideline matrix more
than twenty-five percent or six months, whichever is greater.3" Thus, offenders with similar criminal histories, convicted of the same crime under similar
circumstances, will receive fairly uniform sentences.
A. Establishing the Vertical Guideline Axis
Section 1BI.1 of the Guidelines sets forth the steps used in establishing
the vertical axis value, or offense level.3' Establishing the offense level requires consideration of not only conduct constituting an element of the offense
charged, but also the totality of the "relevant" criminal conduct.3 2 As defined
by section 1B1.3, "relevant conduct" includes all "acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully
caused by the defendant ... that occurred during the commission of the

20. See generally U.S.S.G. Ch.1 (providing a mission statement and philosophical, historical,
and other background information); Hoffman, supra note 12, at 388-90 (using a money laundering
hypothetical to illustrate the application of the Guidelines).
21. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A (Sentencing Table), reprinted infra app. 1.
22. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(4)(b), intro, comment. (p.s.). The Guidelines require the judge to
impose a sentence within this range unless the court finds an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind (or to a degree) not adequately considered by the Commission. Id.
23. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.1); see supra note 21.
24. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.1); see supra note 21.
25. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.1); see supra note 21.
26. U.S.S.G. § IB1.1(a)-(e) (Application Guidelines); see infra notes 31-67 and accompanying text.
27. U.S.S.G. § 11l.l(f); see infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
28. U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.l(g); see infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
29. U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.l(i); see infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1994); U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(2), intro, comment.
31. U.S.S.G. § lBl.l(a)-(e).
32. U.S.S.G. § IB1.3 (Relevant Conduct) (listing "factors that determine the guideline
range"); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (backg'd.) (explaining the difference between the
breadth of information relevant in determining the guideline range and that relevant in determining
the ultimate sentence under § 1B1.4).
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offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that-offense" and any harm
caused thereby. 3 The scope of "relevant conduct" in a "jointly undertaken
criminal activity,"34 for example, is very broad and includes "all reasonably
foreseeable acts and omissions
of others in furtherance of the jointly undertak35
en criminal activity.
To establish the vertical guideline axis within this broad definitional parameter, judges must first locate the base offense level from the appropriate
guideline in Chapter Two and apply any relevant offense-specific and
nonoffense-specific adjustments.36 A judge then gives these classifications
numerical weight and applies them to the vertical grid axis.33
1. The Base Offense Level
Each statutorily defined federal offense corresponds to one of forty-three
base offense levels.3 To find the corresponding level for a specific offense, a
judge must find the applicable "offense guideline section" from Chapter Two
of the Guidelines using the Statutory Index in Appendix A.39 The offense
guideline section gives the base offense level for the offense.' For example,
burglary, an offense covered by section 2B2.1, has a base offense level of
seventeen if the offender burglarizes a residence but only twelve if the burglary involves a structure other than a residence. 4
2. Offense-Specific Adjustments to the Base Offense Level
Each offense guideline section in Chapter Two may contain specific offense characteristics that adjust the base offense level upward or downward.42
For example, the specific offense characteristics for burglary include: (1) an
offender used "more than minimal planning" (two-level increase); (2) the loss
exceeded $2,500 (one- to eight-level increase); (3) an offender stole a "firearm, destructive device, or controlled substance" (one-level increase); and (4)

33. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(l)-(2).
34. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
35. Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B 1.3, comment. (n.2(c)) (providing examples of "jointly undertaken" conduct for which an offender may be accountable).
36. See U.S.S.G. § IBI.1(a)-(e) (Application Instructions); U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.2(b) (Applicable
Guidelines) (directing sentencing judge to consult § IB 1.3 when determining the applicable guideline range); see also U.S.S.G. § IBl.1, comment. (n.1(l)) (including "relevant conduct," as defined
in § 1B1.3 in the definition of "offense," unless otherwise stated or apparent from the context).
37. See U.S.S.G. § lBl.1(g) (instructing sentencing judge on how to plot the vertical and
horizontal axes on the matrix); U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.1).
38. See supra note 21.
39. U.S.S.G. § 1B.l(a); see U.S.S.G. App. A. Each guideline section may cover multiple
statutes, while a single statute may reference multiple guideline sections. U.S.S.G. App. A., intro.
comment. The introductory commentary to the Statutory Index explains how to determine the
correct guideline section when a statute corresponds to multiple guidelines. Id.
40. U.S.S.G. § lB.1(a).
41. U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1(a). Specific adjustments for nominal loss value over $2500 vary from
one to eight levels as the amount increases. U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1(b)(2).
42. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(b); see also U.S.S.G. § IB1.2, comment. (nn.2-4) (directing a court to
determine specific offense characteristics based on the offender's "relevant conduct," defined in
§ 11.3).
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an offender possessed a dangerous weapon during the offense (two-level increase).43
3. Non-offense-Specific Adjustments to the Base Offense Level
Chapter Three describes non-offense-specific characteristics that may warrant upward or downward adjustments." Part A prescribes victim-related adjustments for cases where the victim was especially vulnerable,45 or had an
official status,' where an offender physically restrained a victim,47 or where
an offense could constitute a hate crimei5 Parts B and C contain adjustments
for an offender's role in the offense. 9 The Guidelines increase the sentence if
an offender had a significant role in an offense," or abused a position of
trust or used special skill." If the offender was an "insignificant participant"
in the offense, Part B directs the judge to reduce the offense level. 2 Part C
provides sentencing enhancements for offenders who: (1) "willfully obstructed... or attempted to obstruct... the administration of justice during the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the ... offense";53 or (2) "recklessly create[d] a substantial [threat] of serious 5bodily
injury to another person
4
[while] fleeing from a law enforcement officer. 1
For sentencing on multiple counts, the Commission created Chapter Three,
Part D, which provides incremental sentence enhancements for "significant
additional criminal conduct."55 Section 3D1.1 outlines the requisite procedure
for calculating a single combined offense level which encompasses multiple
offenses committed by one offender. 6 The most serious offense determines

43. U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1 Specific offense characteristics for nominal loss value include the
following adjustments: (A) $2,500 or less, no increase; (B) more than $2,500, add 1 point; (C)
more than $10,000, add 2 points; (D) more than $50,000, add 3 points; (E) more than $250,000,
add 4 points; (F) more than $800,000, add 5 points; (G) more than $1,500,000, add 6 points; (H)
more than $2,500,000, add 7 points; and (I) more than $5,000,000, add 8 points.
44. See U.S.S.G. Ch.3, Pt.A, intro, comment. (providing that section 3A.1 adjustments are
nonoffense-specific and may apply to a wide variety of offenses); U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a) (declaring
Chapter Three adjustments relevant in determining the guideline range).
45. U.S.S.G. § 3Al.l(b) (establishing a two-level enhancement for offenders who "knew or
should have known that a victim ... was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental
condition, or... otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct").
46. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 (providing for three-level enhancement for offenses against government officers or employees or their family members, and for offenses involving an assault on a
law enforcement officer).
47. U.S.S.G. § 3AI.3 (providing for a two-level enhancement).
48. See U.S.S.G. § 3Al.l(a) (establishing a three-level enhancement for crimes motivated by
the victim's actual or perceived class status).
49. U.S.S.G. Ch.3, Pt.B, intro. comment. (instructing a trial court to determine an offender's
role on the basis of all relevant conduct within the scope of § IB 1.3).
50. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (providing sentence enhancements for an offender's role as organizer
or leader in crimes committed by multiple offenders).
51. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 (providing a two-level enhancement for offenders who abused a position of trust or used a special skill "in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission ...
of the offense").
52. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (providing reductions for offenders who had a minimal or minor role
in the offense).
53. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.L (establishing a two-level enhancement).
54. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 (establishing a two-level enhancement).
55. U.S.S.G. Ch.3, Pt.D, intro, comment.
56. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.! (instructing a sentencing judge to group closely related counts pursuant
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the basis for establishing the base offense level,57 and additional counts increase the offense level."
Section 3D1.2 mandates "grouping" of offenses charged in multiple-count
indictments when the offenses "involve substantially the same harm." 9 Section 3D1.3 treats "grouped" offenses as a single combined offense for determining the applicable sentencing range.' The range for each group will correspond either to the offense level of the most serious offense or to the range
determined by the combined total of Chapter Two and Chapter Three adjustments for the "aggregate" criminal conduct for all offenses.6' For example,
under section (a), counts are "grouped" if they "involve the same victim and
'
the same act or transaction."62
Therefore, if a defendant kidnaps a victim and
assaults the victim during the kidnapping, the counts of kidnapping and assault
are grouped for sentencing purposes.63
A sentencing judge then makes a final adjustment to the offense level
depending on the offender's acceptance of responsibility for the offense.'
Section 3El.1(a) provides a two-level sentence reduction for offenders who
"clearly demonstrate acceptance of responsibility."6 Section 3E1.l(b) provides an additional one-level reduction for offenders who also assist the authorities in the investigation or prosection. 6' Offenders qualify for these additional reductions either by providing timely notice of an intention to enter a
guilty plea or by timely disclosure of all relevant information pertaining to
their role in the offense.67

to § 3D1.2 and then determine the offense level applicable to each group under § 3D1.3-.4).
57. U.S.S.G. Ch.3, Pt.D, intro, comment.
58. Id.
59. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. Counts involve substantially the same harm:
When counts involve the same victim and the same act or transaction.
(b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan.
When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the counts.
When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or
loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other measure of aggregate
harm ....
Id.
60. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3.
61. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a) (prescribing use of the count creating the highest offense level
as the offense level for counts grouped under § 3D1.2(a)-(c)); U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(b) (prescribing
use of the offense level determined by the offender's behavior as a whole as the offense level for
counts grouped under § 3D1.2(d)).
62. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a).
63. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, comment. (n.3(l)).
64. U.S.S.G. § 3El.I (Acceptance of Responsibility).
65. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). Examples of an offender demonstrating acceptance of responsibility
include: "truthfully admitting" the crime; "voluntary payment of restitution" before trial; prompt
and "voluntary surrender to authorities"; "voluntary assistance to authorities" in recovering contraband; "voluntary resignation from the office or position held during the commission of the offense"; and "post-offense rehabilitative efforts." U.S.S.G. § 3El.l, comment. (n.1).
66. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b).
67. Id.
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B. Establishing the Horizontal Guideline Axis
Section 4Al.1 of Chapter Four ("Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood") provides instructions on determining the offender's criminal history
category.' An offender receives points for each prior sentence.' The longer
the sentence, the more points a defendant receives."0 Generally, a defendant
receives three points for each prior sentence of more than thirteen months; two
points for each sentence between sixty days and thirteen months; and one
point for all other prior sentences." A judge calculates the criminal history
category by identifying an offender's prior sentences, assigning each a numerical value, and totalling the values. 2 Factors that affect the weight given to
each prior sentence in computing the total include: the defendant's age at
sentencing; 73 the type of crime; 74 the similarity of the past crime to the current crime; 5 whether the offender is a career offender; 6 whether the offender is an armed career offender; 77 and whether the offender "committed an of-'
fense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.' 7
After totalling the points to determine the proper criminal history category, 9
a judge may further enhance the sentence if the offender committed the instant
offense during the period of a prior sentence, during an escape, or within two
years of release from incarceration. 0
C. Plotting the Vertical and Horizontal Axis Lines on the Sentencing Matrix
A sentencing judge applies the sentencing matrix to calculate the appropriate guideline range.8 ' The intersection of the offense level on the vertical axis
and the criminal history category on the horizontal axis identifies the applicable sentencing range in "months of imprisonment."'" For certain categories of
offenses and offenders, Chapter Five of the Guidelines permits the court to

68. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.I.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. The Guidelines exclude or limit certain prior convictions from a trial court's
sentencing determination, for example: "sentence[s] imposed more than ten years prior to the
defendant's commencement of the instant offense" and "adult or juvenile sentence[sl imposed for
an offense committed prior to the defendant's eighteenth birthday" occurring five years prior to
the defendant's commencement of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. § 4Ail, comment. (nn.1-3);
U.S.S.G. § 4AI.2(d)-(e). See generally U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 (instructing the trial judge on how to
compute criminal history).
72. U.S.S.G. § 4AI.1, comment; U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.3). Ranges for the six
criminal history categories are as follows: category i, 0-1 points; category II, 2-3 points; category
III, 4-6 points; category IV, 7-9 points; category V, 10-12 points; and category VI, 13 or more
points. See U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A (Sentencing Table), reprinted infra app. 1.
73. See U.S.S.G. § 4Ai.2(d).
74. See U.S.S.G. § 4Al.2(b).
75. U.S.S.G. § 4A.lI, comment. (backg'd) (n.6).
76. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1..
77. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4.
78. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.3.
79. Id.
80. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.i(d)-(e).
81. See U.S.S.G. § lB1.l(f)-(g).
82. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.1).
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impose either imprisonment, probation, restitution, or some other sanction or
combination of sanctions. 3
D. Determining Applicable Departuresfrom the Sentencing Guideline Matrix
Section 5K2.0 permits departures from the presumptive range in exceptional circumstances. 4 The Guidelines authorize departures only if a judge
finds "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines."85 To decide whether the Commission
adequately considered a circumstance, a judge must rely entirely on "the sentencing Guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Commission."" Chapter 5, Part K, identifies several factors the Commission expressly identified as grounds for departure from the Guidelines, including: a
defendant's "unusually heinous, cruel or brutal conduct" toward the victim;"
an offender's substantial assistance in the prosecution of others;88 an offender
who created or threatened the harm that the criminal statute sought to prevent;89 and highly provocative behavior by a victim.'
Part H further delineates a list of "specific offender characteristics" which
may justify a departure from the Guidelines' prescribed sentencing range.9'
Specific offender characteristics include an offender's advanced age92 or "extraordinary physical impairment."9' The Commission warned, however, that
these characteristics are rarely relevant in establishing a sentence outside the
applicable guideline range.94 Moreover, the Guidelines expressly prevent a
sentencing judge from considering the offender's "race, sex, national origin,
'
creed, religion, socioeconomic status,"95
or "disadvantaged upbringing."
83. U.S.S.G. § lB1.1(h) (instructing sentencing court to consider the sentencing options
delineated in Chapter Five, Parts B through G); see U.S.S.G. §§ 5Bi.1, 5Dl.i, 5Ei.i, 5FL.i (listing, respectively, circumstances in which a court can impose probation, supervised release, restitution, and other "sentencing options").
84. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. (Grounds for Departure).
85. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994)).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
87. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8, p.s.
88. U.S.S.G. § 5KI.1, p.s.
89. U.S.S.G. § 5D2.11, p.s.
90. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10. Other bases for a sentencing departure include: refusal to assist authorities, § 5KI.2, p.s.; abduction or restraint of a victim, § 5K2.4, p.s.; use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities, § 5K2.6, p.s.; disruption of a governmental function, § 5K2.7, p.s.; concealment of a prior offense by committing an additional offense, § 5K2.9, p.s.; commission of the
offense under coercion or duress, § 5K2.12, p.s.; diminished mental capacity, § 5K2.13, p.s.; commission of the offense posed a "significant" risk to public health or welfare, § 5K2.14, p.s.; voluntary admission and disclosure of the offense to authorities, § 5K2.16, p.s.; or the offense resulted
in death, § 5K2.1, p.s., serious bodily injury, § 5K2.2, p.s., extreme psychological injury, § 5K2.3,
p.s., or extreme property loss, § 5K2.5, p.s.
91. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1-. 11, p.s. (providing policy statements outlining 11 "specific offender characteristics" that may justify a departure from the prescribed guideline range).
92. U.S.S.G. § 5HI.1, p.s. (justifying a sentence departure when an offender is "elderly and
infirm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as
and less costly than incarceration").
93. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, p.s.
94. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.H, intro, comment.
95. U.S.S.G. § 5HI.10, p.s.
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The Guidelines do not authorize any departure in the absence of sufficiently "atypical circumstances or characteristics" that warrant divergence from
the required sentencing range.97 The Sentencing Commission, while not foreclosing the possibility of an atypical circumstance, specifically stated that such
circumstances are "extremely rare." 9 A judge's dissatisfaction with the mandatory sentencing range or preference for an unauthorized sentence are inappropriate bases for departing from the Guidelines.'
III. DECISIONS LIMITING THE SCOPE OF CONDUCT REVIEWABLE IN MAKING
SENTENCING DETERMINATIONS

A. United States v. Warner" °
1. Facts

Warner received a sentence for unlawful machine gun possession.'
During the initial sentencing, the trial court improperly allowed a downward
departure under the "sporting and collection" exception in section
2K2.1(b)(2).' ° The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for de
novo resentencing." 3 On resentencing, the trial court allowed a section
5K2.0 downward departure."° The trial court justified the downward departure, in part, because the defendant had already successfully completed a rehabilitation program and a six-month period of home confinement. 5
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's resentencing determination,
concluding that it was impermissible to consider evidence of conduct occurring after initial sentencing."° Instead, in making de novo resentencing determinations, the trial court may consider only those factors arising out of evidence that the court could have heard at the original sentencing hearing. 7
In Warner, the government asked the court to extend the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits' rationales in United States v. Apple'" and United States v. Gomez°
which held that trial courts cannot consider post-sentencing
Padilla,"

96.
97.

U.S.S.G. § 5H1.12, p.s.
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, comment.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.

43 F.3d 1335 (10th
Warner, 43 F.3d at
Warner, 43 F.3d at
Warner, 43 F.3d at

Cir. 1994).
1336; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994).
1340; see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2).
1336.

104. Id. Section 5K2.0 permits departures in exceptional circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 84-96 (discussing § 5K2.0).
105. Warner, 43 F.3d at 1336-37. The court also believed that the "unshootable" collectable
nature of the gun qualified the defendant for the "lesser harms" departure in § 5K2. 11. Id.
106. Id. at 1336-37, 1340.
107. Id. at 1340.
108. 962 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1992).
109. 972 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1992); see Warner, 43 F.3d at 1340 (distinguishing Apple and
Gomez-Padilla).
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conduct upon a limited remand for resentencing." ' The Warner court distinguished Apple and Gomez-Padilla because those cases did not involve fully de
novo resentencing."'
B. United States v. Gacnik" 2
1. Facts
Three defendants pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture explosive
materials without a license." '3 Defendants Gade and Sandoval manufactured
aluminum flash powder, and then sold the volatile explosive to juveniles." 4
Gade was in custody for an unrelated charge when law enforcement officials received information that he was manufacturing explosives." 5 The officers obtained a search warrant and returned to Gade's residence to search for
the explosives." 6 Meanwhile, unaware of the impending search, defendants
Sandoval and Gacnik had concealed the explosive materials." 7 As a result,
the district court enhanced Gacnik's conspiracy offense level by two points for
obstructing the investigation, pursuant to section 3C1.1." 8
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit overturned the trial court's decision to apply section
3C1.1 by looking to the section's plain language. Section 3C1.1 articulates a
two-part "nexus requirement": the obstructive conduct must "relate to the
offense of conviction" and occur during the investigation.' The Tenth Circuit concluded that "obstructive conduct undertaken prior to the investigation ... [or] prior to any indication of an impending investigation ... does
not fulfill this nexus requirement. ''120
The court expressly disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's holding in United
States v. Dortch,'2 ' which read section 3C1.1 more broadly.' 22 The Eighth
Circuit reasoned that the "offense of conviction may not be what initially
attracts police attention," and that an act intended to conceal the "instant offense," even when the offender is aware only of an investigation into another
23
offense, meets section 3C1.1 requirements.'

110. Warner, 43 F.3d at 1339; Gomez-Padilla, 972 F.2d at 285-86; Apple, 962 F.2d at 336.
111. Warner, 43 F.3d at 1340.
112. 50 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1995).
113. Gacnik, 50 F.3d at 850; see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
114. Gacnik, 50 F.3d at 851.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (mandating that "[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede the administration of justice during the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense," a judge must "increase the offense level by two
levels").
119. Gacnik, 50 F.3d at 852.
120. Id.
121. 923 F.2d 629 (Sth Cir. 1991).
122. Gacnik, 50 F.3d at 852; see Dortch, 923 F.2d at 632.
123. Gacnik, 50 F.3d at 852; see Dortch, 923 F.2d at 632.
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According to the Tenth Circuit, the Eight Circuit overlooked the plain
language of section 3C1,1 which provides a sentence enhancement for "willful" obstructive conduct pertaining to "the investigation ... of the instant
offense."' 24 Obstructing an investigation into an unrelated offense does not
sufficiently relate to the "instant offense" and therefore does not warrant a
section 3C1.1 sentencing enhancement. 5 The record must demonstrate that
the offender possessed actual knowledge of a possible investigation
into the
2 6
instant offense to fulfill the section 3C1.1 nexus requirement.
C. Analysis
The requirement of proof of actual knowledge presents a difficult standard
for prosecutors, Moreover, facilitating investigations into criminal conduct and
the subsequent apprehension of the offender appear to be the underlying purposes of section 3C 1.1. Obstructive conduct not motivated by knowledge of a
pending investigation will thwart investigative efforts just as obstructive
con27
duct initiated by an offender's knowledge of the investigation.
Cumulatively, Warner and Gacnik clarify the parameters for the types of
conduct a sentencing court may examine in making sentencing determinations.
Post-sentencing rehabilitative conduct no longer justifies a reduced sentence.
This outcome removes an incentive for an offender subject to de novo
resentencing to engage in post-sentencing rehabilitative conduct. Despite this
probable outcome, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Warner
is consistent with
29
2
decisions of the Fourth Circuit 2 and the Eighth Circuit.
IV.

DECISIONS APPLYING SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS IN SECTIONS

3B1.3

3°

T

AND 2T1.1(B)(2) '
32

A. United States v. Gandy1
1. Facts

Gandy, a licensed podiatrist, pleaded guilty to falsifying health insurance
claims. 33 The trial court applied a two-level sentence enhancement under
section 3B1.3 because Gandy used his special skill as a podiatrist to falsify

124. Gacnik, 50 F.3d at 852 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3C1.l).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. The author acknowledges, however, that some could argue that "willful" requires knowledge that the conduct will thwart any potential effort to investigate the offender's crime, but not
that the offender actually knew that the investigation has been initiated.
128. United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir. 1993).
129. United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992).
130. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill).
131. U.S.S.G. 2Tl.l(b)(2) (Tax Evasion; Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information,
or Pay Tax; Fraudulent or False Returns, Statements, or Other Documents) ("If sophisticated
means were used to impede discovery of the existence or extent of the offense, increase by 2
levels.").
132. 36 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 1994).
133. Gandy, 36 F.3d at 913; see 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
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Medicare forms for various reimbursable procedures he did not perform.
Gandy appealed the enhancement.' 35

34

2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit applied a two-part test to determine the applicability of
the special skill enhancement under section 3B1.3. The offender must "possess
a special skill," and must actually employ the special skill to "significantly
facilitate the commission or concealment of his offense."'136 The court noted
that the commentary to section 3B1.3 defines "special skill" as "a skill not
possessed by members of the general public and usually requiring substantial
education, training or licensing. ' 33 Additionally, the section lists physicians
among its examples of persons with special skill along with "pilots, lawyers, . . accountants, chemists, and demolition experts.'f 3 Gandy did not
dispute that his podiatry license qualified as a "special skill," so the first part
of the test was undisputed.'39 However, section 3B1.3 also requires that the
offender use that special skill to "significantly facilitate the commission or
concealment of the offense.""
Because the Guidelines fail to define "facilitate," the Tenth Circuit relied
upon the common definition of the word: to "make easier."'' The Tenth Circuit found that the trial court failed to adequately determine whether Gandy
actually employed his skill as a podiatrist to make the crime of Medicare fraud
easier.'42 The trial court therefore had an insufficient factual basis to justify
an enhancement under section 3B1.3.43
B. United States v. Rice'"
1. Facts
Rice, a certified public accountant, was convicted of making false claims
for income tax refunds and filing false income tax returns. 45 Rice used various Subchapter S corporations in order to facilitate a "complicated scheme of

Gandy, 36 F.3d at 913. Section 3B1.3 provides in part:
If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special
skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the
offense, increase by 2 levels. This adjustment may not be employed if an abuse of trust
or skill is included in the base offense level or specific offense characteristic.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.
135. Gandy, 36 F.3d at 914.
136. Id. at 915.
137. Id. at 914 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.2)).
138. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.2)).
139. Id. at 915.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 914 (citing United States v. Young, 932 F.2d 1510, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The
D.C. Circuit adopted its definition from WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 410 (5th ed.
1977). Young, 932 F.2d at 1513.
142. Gandy, 36 F.3d at 915.
143. Id.
144. 52 F.3d 843 (10th Cir. 1995).
145. Rice, 52 F.3d at 844; see 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994); 26 U.S.C. § 7206(l) (1994).
134.
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tax fraud."'" The trial court calculated Rice's sentence using both section
2T1.1 (Tax Evasion) and section 2F1.1 (Fraud or Deceit), and each calculation
resulted in the same total adjusted offense level. 47 The total adjusted offense
level included enhancements under three guideline provisions: section
3B1.3,' providing an enhancement for use of a "special skill"; section
2Tl.1(b)(2), 49 providing an enhancement for using "sophisticated means" in
tax evasion crimes; and section 2FI.I(b)(2)(A), 5 ° providing an enhancement
where the defendant used "more than minimal planning" in committing
5
fraud.'
2. Decision
Relying on the two-part test established in Gandy,' the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's application of section 3B1.3 for the defendant's
use of a special skill.'53 Rice's status as an accountant satisfied step one of
the Gandy inquiry, since the Commission specifically listed accountants as
persons possessing a special skill.' 54 As for the second step, the trial court
failed to make specific factual findings regarding how Rice used his certified
public accounting skills to facilitate tax evasion.' Nonetheless, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the record, taken as a whole, demonstrated that Rice's
actions satisfied the second step of the Gandy inquiry.'56
The Tenth Circuit then examined the applicability of the sophisticated
means enhancement. The commentary to section 2T1.l(b)(2) defines "sophisticated means" as "conduct that is more complex or demonstrates greater intricacy or planning than a routine tax evasion case."' 57 Because the Tenth Circuit found that Rice's fraud was the "functional equivalent" of simply claiming
excessive itemized deductions, the court held that the tax evasion scheme did
not constitute "sophisticated means."' 58 To categorize this conduct as sophisticated, the court reasoned, would require sentencing courts to apply section
2Tl.l(b)(2) to virtually every fraudulent tax return scheme.'59 The Tenth Circuit determined that the Guidelines did not contemplate this result."6°

146. Rice, 52 F.3d at 844.
147. Id.
148. See U.S.S.G. § 3BI.3.
149. See U.S.S.G. § 2Tl.1(b)(2).
150. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.I(b)(2)(A).
151. Rice, 52 F.3d 848-50. For a general discussion on sentencing guidelines for multiple
counts, see supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of the two-prong test set forth in Gandy, see supra text accompanying
note 136.
153. Rice, 52 F.3d at 850.
154. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.2)).
1.55. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 849; see U.S.S.G. § 2TI.I, comment. (n.4).
158. Rice, 52 F.3d at 849. The court relied on examples in the commentary to § 2Tl.1 suggesting that a proper "sophisticated means" enhancement requires a level of sophistication associated with the utilization of offshore bank accounts or transactions through corporate shells for taxevasion purposes. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 2Tl.1, comment. (n.4).
159. Rice, 52 F.3d at 849.
160. Id.
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Finally, the Tenth Circuit analyzed whether the district court's application
of the special skill enhancement, along with either the "sophisticated means"
or "more than minimal planning" enhancements, constituted "impermissible
double counting."' 6 The court concluded that each provision served a distinct purpose.'62 Criminals who use their special talents to commit even the
simplest of crimes deserve an upward adjustment under the special skill enhancement.'63 In contrast, the "sophisticated means" and "more than minimal
planning" enhancements are intended to punish offenders who use complex
criminal schemes."6 Therefore, the simultaneous application of the special
skill enhancement along with one of the other two enhancements did not constitute impermissible double counting.'65
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's determination that the sophisticated means enhancement and the special skills enhancement did not constitute impermissible double counting is somewhat problematic. An offender who engages in a sophisticated criminal scheme most likely possesses a special skill acquired through
specialized education, experience, or self-teaching. An expansive interpretation
of "special skill" would encompass the common burglar who through experience and self-teaching acquired a particular skill for breaking and entering.
While the Tenth Circuit's adoption of such an expansive view is unlikely, the
Gandy decision supports this conclusion.
V.

DECISIONS IMPOSING A CONCURRENT SENTENCE ON A DEFENDANT
167
66
SUBJECT TO GUIDELINE SECTIONS 5G1.3(B)' AND 5G1.3(c)

A. United States v. Johnson"6
1. Facts
Oklahoma officials arrested Johnson for driving a stolen vehicle." 6
While confined in county jail, Johnson and another prisoner escaped and were
recaptured. 71 Johnson pleaded guilty to operating a stolen vehicle and eight

161. Id. at 850. The court had defined "impermissible double counting" as using the same
conduct to support separate sentencing enhancements having identical purposes. Id. at 850-51
(citing United States v. Flinn, 18 F.3d 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1994)).
162. Id. at 851.
163. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (backg'd.).
164. Rice, 52 F.3d at 851; see, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2T.l, comment. (n.4).
165. Rice, 52 F.3d at 851.
166. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b).
167. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c), p.s. (providing that in cases not covered by subsections (a) and (b),
"the sentence for the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or
consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment
for the instant offense").
168. 40 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 1994).
169. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1080. The escapees fired a volley of gunshots and tossed numerous
incendiary devices at state officials during their escape. Id.
170.

Id.
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977

escape-related state law violations. 7' He received various state sentences and
the trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. 7 1 Johnson also
pleaded guilty to two federal law violations,'" and the trial court
ordered the
74
federal sentence to begin upon completion of the state sentence.
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit noted that section 5G1.3(b) limits the court's traditionally broad discretion in sentencing defendants.'75 When the offense in question is committed during a term of imprisonment, subsection (a) requires consecutive sentencing. Conversely, subsection (b) requires a concurrent sentence when subsection (a) does not apply and the court fully considers the
conduct underlying the undischarged term of imprisonment.'77
Johnson argued that because the presentence report fully detailed the
conduct underlying the undischarged state-related escape sentence, section
5G1.3(b) required the district court to impose a concurrent sentence.' The
Tenth Circuit rejected this argument and concluded that section 5G1.3(b) applies when an offender is prosecuted in both state and federal court for the
same criminal conduct or for different criminal transactions that constitute part
of the same course of conduct.'79
The other issue examined by the Tenth Circuit in Johnson involved the
trial court's departure from the methodology for applying section
5G1.3(c).' The commentary to section 5G1.3(c) instructs the trial court to
establish the total punishment for all the prior and instant offenses as if section
5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction) applied.'' Thus, the
court should calculate a reasonable incremental sentence for the instant

171.

Id.

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1082.
175. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). This subsection provides:
If subsection (a) does not apply, and the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted
from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed
to run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment.
Id.
176. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(a).
177. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b).
178. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1082-83.
179. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (n.2).
180. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1083-84. Subsection (c) permits the trial imposition of a concurrent,
partially concurrent, or consecutive sentence prior to the undischarged term of imprisonment "[t]o
the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the offense." U.S.S.G. §
5G1.3(c).
181. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1083. Application note (3) states:
To the extent practicable, the court should consider a reasonable incremental
penalty to be a sentence for the instant offense that results in a combined sentence of
imprisonment that approximates the total punishment that would have been imposed
under § 5GI.2 ... had all the offenses been federal offenses for which sentences were
being imposed at the same time.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (n.3).
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offense." ' This should result in a combined sentence that approximates the
total punishment in accordance with section 5G1.2 had all offenses been federal offenses.8 3 Following the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in United States v.
Haney,"4 the Tenth Circuit in Johnson relied upon the methodology in the
commentary to section 5G1.3(c) to interpret and explain how courts should
apply this provision. 5
The Tenth Circuit determined that although the trial court should consider
subsection (c) in imposing a sentence, a court may depart from the methodology.8 6 The Commission itself recognized that sometimes the comprehensive
application of subsection (c) would be "impracticable."'8 7 Certain factors,
such as insufficient information about prior offenses, warrant a sentencing
court's discretion. 88 In such circumstances, a trial court may employ a simpler sentencing determination method that constitutes the "functional equivalent of more complex computations."'8 9 In other words, the court may make
rough estimates.
A trial court departing from the analysis required by section 5G1.3(c),
however, must state its reasons for doing so."'" In Johnson, the Tenth Circuit found that the trial court impermissibly departed from the methodology of
section 5G1.3(c) and failed to justify such a departure.' 9 '
B. United States v. Yates

92

1. Facts
Charles Yates pleaded guilty to abusive sexual contact with a minor on an
Indian Reservation. 93 The trial court sentenced Yates to seven years of confinement with an additional three-year period of supervised release.' 94 Yates95
appealed the sentence, and the Tenth Circuit remanded for resentencing.
While the resentencing was pending, Yates received an eighteen-year state
court sentence for two counts of criminal sexual penetration and one count of
kidnapping."'

182. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1083.
183. Id.
184. 23 F.3d 1413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 253 (1994).

185. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1083. This determination is also consistent with the Sixth Circuit's
holding in United States v. Coleman, 15 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that a trial court should
employ the methodology set forth in the commentary of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) to determine whether
a consecutive sentence results in a reasonable incremental punishment).
186. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1084.
187. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 5GI.3, comment. (n.3) (providing a list of factors for courts to consider in order to "achieve a reasonable punishment").
188. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1084.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 58 F.3d 542 (10th Cir. 1995).
193. Yates, 58 F.3d at 543.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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On resentencing the trial court applied section 5G1.3(c) and ordered the
federal sentence to run consecutively with the state term of imprisonment,
amounting to a total of twenty-five years of imprisonment.'97 Yates appealed
on the grounds that the section 5G1.3 application methodology provides for a
seventeen to twenty-one year total combined sentence for the analogous federal offense levels under section 2A1.3.19s
Yates asserted that since the eighteen-year state sentence fell within this
sentencing range, an additional seven years of consecutive imprisonment was
unnecessary for a reasonable incremental punishment under section
5G1.3(c).' 99 The trial court determined that Yates did not qualify for a concurrent sentence under section 5G1.3(c). 2° Assuming good time credits, the
court reasoned, Yates would effectively serve a only nine to twelve years of
state imprisonment, rendering his total combined sentence to approximately
twenty-two years in length."'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that in applying section 5G1.3(c), courts may
consider the actual term of a state sentence rather than the nominal state sentence. 0 2 This is only permissible, however, if a trial court can reliably determine the real or effective term of state imprisonment.2 3 A sentencing
judge must make a factual determination on the basis of the available evidence
and provide rational explanations for that determination.2 4 In Yates, the record did not support the trial court's assumption that the real or effective term
of the defendant's sentence would constitute only twelve years.25 The Tenth
Circuit noted that application note three in the Guidelines indicates that a lack
of information concerning an offender's prior state offense prevents an accurate estimate of the total sentence required by the Guidelines.2" Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit vacated the sentencing decision and remanded the matter for
resentencing.2 °7

197. Id. Section 5G1.3(c) mandates that a trial court impose a consecutive sentence for the
instant offense prior to the undischarged term of imprisonment to the "extent necessary to achieve
a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 5GI.3(c), p.s. If the trial
court can achieve a reasonable incremental punishment by imposing a concurrent sentence with
the remainder of an unexpired term of imprisonment, a consecutive sentence is not warranted. See
U.S.S.G. § 5GI.3(c), p.s. (permitting concurrent, partially concurrent, or consecutive sentences to
achieve "reasonable incremental punishment").
198. Yates, 58 F.3d at 544.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 546-47.
202. Id. at 548-49.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 549.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 544; U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c), comment. (n.3); see also United States v. Hunter, 993
F.2d 127, 131 (6th Cir. 1993) (Ryan, J., concurring) (setting forth examples when application of
the methodology is impracticable and stating that a trial court should calculate an offender's sentence under section 5G1.3(c) only to the "extent practicable" and in a manner that does not "unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process").
207. Yates, 58 F.3d at 550.
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C. Analysis
In establishing the section 5G1.3(c) methodology, the Sentencing Commission anticipated the complexity of applying this provision. 8 This complexity, however, does not justify a trial court's refusal to consider subsection
(c)'s methodological implications.2 °"
The Yates and Johnson decisions exemplify not only the complexity and
arbitrariness of applying section 5G1.3(a)-(c), but also the Tenth Circuit's
reliance on the commentary to the Guidelines and the underlying congressional
goals. The Tenth Circuit also relied heavily on other circuits to verify the
accuracy of their sentencing guideline interpretations.
In Yates, the Tenth Circuit required the trial court to determine reasonable
incremental punishment based on a preponderance of the evidence."' The
Tenth Circuit reiterated the holding of the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Brewer,2 ' that a trial court must make more than a mere educated guess in
determining the "likely" real or effective term of imprisonment."' The trial
court must determine the reasonableness of the incremental punishment pursuant to section 5G1.3(c) upon establishing the real or effective sentence.2 3
While no specific criteria exist for making this determination, the trial court
must state its findings and explain its rationale for determining the reasonableness of the incremental punishment.2 4
VI.

DECISIONS ADDRESSING WHETHER THE APPLICATION OF GUIDELINE
SECTIONS 2J1.725 AND 2K2.421 6 REQUIRE THE SENTENCING COURT TO
IMPOSE ENHANCED SENTENCES CONSECUTIVELY TO A STATE IMPRISONMENT
TERM

A. United States v.

McCary

2 17

1. Facts
An Oklahoma state court sentenced Tommy McCary to 211 months for
possession of and intent to distribute methamphetamine.2 8 McCary also received a forty-six month federal sentence for possession of a firearm while a

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (n.5).
Id.
Yates, 58 F.3d at 549.
23 F.3d 1317 (8th Cir. 1994).
Brewer, 23 F.3d at 1319.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3.

214.

Id.

215. U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7 (Commission of Offense While on Release) ("If an enhancement under
18 U.S.C. § 3147 applies, add three levels to the offense level for the offense committed while on
release as if this section were a specific offense characteristic contained in the offense guideline ....").Id.
216.

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 (Use of Firearm, Armor-Piercing Ammunition, or Explosive During or

in Relation to Certain Crimes) ("In each case, the statute requires a term of imprisonment imposed
under this section to run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment."). Id.
217.
218.

58 F.3d 521 (10th Cir. 1995).
McCary, 58 F.3d at 522.
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fugitive of justice, 2 9 and for knowing possession of a stolen vehicle that had
crossed state lines. 220
On remand, the trial court imposed a seventeen-month enhancement pursuant to section 2J1.7, which applies 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (Penalty for an Offense
Committed While on Release).2 2' The trial court ordered the enhancement to
run consecutively with the federal charges and concurrently with the 211month state court sentence.222
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit vacated the trial court's sentencing decision and remanded the matter for resentencing.223 Section 3147 requires trial courts to
impose an additional sentence of not more than ten years upon a person convicted of an offense while released on another federal charge. 224 The application notes of section 2J1.7 clarify that § 3147 mandates imprisonment in
addition to the sentence for the underlying offense. 225 The notes also require
that the additional sentence "run consecutively to any other sentence of
'
imprisonment. 226
The Tenth Circuit held that the phrase "any other sentence of imprisonment" clearly encompasses the state court sentence. 227 The trial court therefore erred in failing to order the § 3147 enhancement to run consecutively to
the 21 1-month state court sentence.228
The Tenth Circuit's plain language interpretation is consistent with the
holdings of the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Lincoln229 and the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Galliano.23° In United States v. Wilson, 3 the
Seventh Circuit also held that a trial court must impose a § 3147 enhancement
consecutively to a state sentence.232

219. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2) (1994).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 2313(a) (1994).
221. McCary, 58 F.3d at 522.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 525.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 3147(1) (1994).
225. U.S.S.G. § 2.11.7, comment. (n.2) ("Under 18 U.S.C. § 3147, a sentence of imprisonment
must be imposed in addition to the sentence for the underlying offense, and the sentence of imprisonment imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 must run consecutively to any other sentence of
imprisonment.").
226. Id.
227. McCary, 58 F.3d at 524.
228. Id.
229. 956 F.2d 1465, 1473-74 & n.8 (8th Cir.) (holding that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147
(1988), an offender may not serve a term of such an enhancement concurrently to any other term
of imprisonment), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 891 (1992).
230. 977 F.2d 1350, 1351 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 966 (1993).
231. 966 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1992).
232. Wilson, 966 F.2d at 248.
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2 33
B. United States v. Gonzales

1. Facts
Defendants Gonzales, Perez, Hernandez-Diaz, and Leon all received sentences ranging from 120 to 147 months for various drug charges, including the
"use of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)."' Each offender also received state sentences stemming from the
same incidents.235 For each offender, the trial court imposed a five-year sentence enhancement under section 2K2.4, which in turn applies 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1). 36 The enhanced sentences were to run consecutively with both the
federal and state sentences. 2" The defendants, except Leon, appealed, charging that the trial court erred in ordering the federal sentence under § 924(c) to
run consecutively with the state offenses.238
A provision in § 924(c) requires the imposition of an additional five-year
consecutive sentence for persons possessing a firearm "during a crime of
'
violence or a drug trafficking offense."239
The application notes of section
2K2.4 provide that under § 924(c)(1), a trial court must impose the additional
2'
term of imprisonment consecutively to "any other term of imprisonment. 1
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court, although it noted that the trial
court's decision was consistent with every circuit that previously had considered the issue.2 41' The Tenth Circuit recognized two possible interpretations
for the phrase "any other term of imprisonment."242 The literal interpretation
of the phrase encompasses both federal and state sentences.243 Alternatively,
a court could read the phrase to apply only to federal sentences, excluding any
2
consideration of state imposed sentences in applying 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 1
Adopting the latter view, the Gonzales court relied upon the stated congressional purpose of § 924(c). 45 The Gonzales court stated that an offender
initially sentenced in state court and serving the state court sentence cannot
possibly serve a subsequently imposed federal sentence under § 924(c) prior to
the preexisting state sentence."

233. 65 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1995).
234. Gonzales, 65 F.3d at 817.
235. Id.
236. Id. For the text of § 2K2.4, comment. (n.1), see supra note 216.
237. Gonzales, 65 F.3d at 817.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 820.
240. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, comment. (n.1).
241. Gonzales, 65 F.3d at 819.
242. Id. at 820.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 313-14 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3492 (including a Senate report that reads in part that a defendant must serve
the additional sentence prior to the beginning of the sentence for any other offense).
246. Gonzales, 65 F.3d at 820. It is implausible to suggest that an offender can serve a federal
sentence slated to begin prior to a previously existent state sentence.
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The Gonzales court also reasoned that a literal reading of the statutory
language in § 924(c) produced another absurd result not contemplated by
Congress.24 Upon calculating the defendant's total sentence under the
Guidelines, the Gonzales court determined that a combined reading of § 924(c)
resulted in more than twice the custodial price intended by Congress for the
totality of the defendants' criminal conduct in this case. 2' The Gonzales
court concluded that the prohibition against concurrent sentences under §
924(c) refers only to federal sentences.249 Under this reading, an offender
begins serving the mandatory five-year sentence pursuant to § 924(c) immediately upon the federal court's final sentencing decision." ° Under this interpretation, the trial court erred in ordering the § 924(c) five-year sentence to
run consecutively to the defendants' state court sentences.2 5'
C. Analysis
After McCary and Gonzales, the Tenth Circuit's position as to whether
application of Title 18 sentencing enhancements requires consecutive state sentencing is unclear. The absence of any clear factual distinctions or policy
differences precludes a simple explanation for the Tenth Circuit's inconsistent
holdings. The plain language of the Title 18 sentencing enhancements, coupled
with the plain language of the Guideline sections that effectuate these enhancements, suggest the accuracy of the McCary decision. Further, as previously
noted, the vast majority of circuit courts that have addressed the issue agree
with the McCary approach.252
VII.

DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE APPLICATION OF SECTION

2F1.1 (B)(3)(A)

25

A. United States v. Frazier254
1. Facts
Gregory Frazier was the former president of the National Indian Business
Counsel, doing business as the United Tribe Service Center (UTSC), a nonprofit corporation assisting the education of American Indians." The UTSC
received funding from the United States Department of Labor (DOL) pursuant
to the Job Training Partnership Act.256 Frazier was convicted of "intentionally misapplying property valued at $5,000 or more and owned by or under the

247. Id.
248. Id.at 821.
249. Id.
250. Id. All other federal sentences for any additional substantive offenses begin immediately
after the expiration of the mandatory 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) five-year sentence. Id.
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
253. U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) (providing an enhancement for offenses involving a misrepresentation that a defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable organization).
254. 53 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 1995).
255. Frazier,53 F.3d at 1108.
256. Id.
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care, custody or control of the UTSC," under 18 U.S.C. § 666." The trial
court imposed a section 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) enhancement on the basis that Frazier
committed the offense while acting on behalf of an educational affiliated agency.258 Frazier appealed the enhancement.259
2. Decision
The plain language of section 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) penalizes the offender who
"misrepresent[s]" that he "acted on behalf of a governmental agency or a
charitable, educational, religious or political organization, or a government
agency.''2' The Tenth Circuit used the Random House Dictionary to define
"misrepresent" as making a false representation that generally involves a "deliberate intention to deceive for either profit or advantage." 26' The phrase "on
behalf of' means, in this context, a "representative of, or in the interest or aid
'
of."262
An offender therefore receives an enhanced punishment if she either
(a) falsely claims to represent the organization, or (b) falsely claims to act "in
the interest or aid of' the organization.263
The Frazier court, however, rejected this literal interpretation as overly
expansive.M Instead, the Tenth Circuit examined Application note four, the
Commentary adjoining section 2F.I(b)(3)(A), and the hypothetical examples
they contained, to establish the parameters of conduct intended to fall within
the purview of the guideline. 265 The conduct falling within the scope of section 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) is "exploitative conduct which induces victims to act upon
their charitable or trusting impulses."" 6 The Tenth Circuit determined that
section 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) applies only to offenders who misrepresent their authority to act on behalf of a governmental agency or a charitable organization,
if the offender's conduct "induces" the victim to contribute funds. 67
The hypothetical examples accompanying section 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) suggest
that the offender must also utilize "exploitive" conduct in furthering the offense of conviction. 2" Section 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) applies, for example, to offenders who seek donations under the guise of fundraising for a parochial
school, soliciting contributions for a nonexistent charitable organization, or
collecting delinquent student loan funds while posing as a federal collection
agent.2 9

257. id.; 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
258. Frazier, 53 F.3d at 1109.
259. Id.
260. U.S.S.G. § 2FI.I(b)(3)(A). "If the offense involved (A) a misrepresentation that the
defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious or political organization, or a
government agency, or (B) violation of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree, or
process not addressed elsewhere in the Guidelines, increase by two levels." Id.
261. Frazier,53 F.3d at 1112.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1113.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.; U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l, comment. (n.4).
269. Frazier, 53 F.3d at 1112; U.S.S.G. § 2FI.1, comment. (n.4).
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The defendant, as the former president of an educational organization,
misappropriated the organization's DOL grant funds.27 The defendant did
not engage in "exploitive" conduct by affirmatively soliciting contributions
"
' The trial court therefore erred in imposing a section
from the public.27
2F1I.(b)(3)(A) sentencing enhancement.272
The Tenth Circuit stated that paragraph four of section 2F1I.1(b)(3)(A)
applies to offenders who engage in "false pretenses" and "exploit" the generosity of their victims. 27 3 In adopting this narrow interpretation, the Tenth Circuit specifically rejected the Fourth Circuit's holding in United States v.
Marcum 274
VIII.

ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY: DECISIONS ADDRESSING WHETHER
THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL PRECLUDES THE APPLICATION OF SECTION

3.EI .1(B)(1)-(2)
A. United States v.

Ortiz

25

27 6

1. Facts
Julio Ortiz, when found with the possession of a stolen handgun with a
filed-off serial number, pleaded to "unlawful possession of a firearm with an
obliterated manufacturer's serial number" under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). 277 Ortiz
asserted that this "acceptance of responsibility" entitled him to a large downward adjustment of his sentence, but the trial court refused to award a sentencing reduction under section 3El.l(b). 2" Despite the defendant's admitted
knowledge of the obliterated serial number, the trial court determined that the
commencement of trial before the admission precluded application of section
3E1.1(b)(2).279
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit determined that the trial court, while correct in its reading of section 3El.1(b)(2), erred in failing to determine the applicability of a
section 3El.I(b)(1) sentencing reduction. The Tenth Circuit noted that section
3E1.l(b) of the Guidelines permits an additional one-level reduction for offenders who assist authorities in the investigation or prosecution of the instant

270. Frazier,53 F.3d at 1114.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1112.
274. Id. at 1114; see United States v. Marcum, 16 F.3d 599 (4th Cir.) (holding that U.S.S.G.
§ 2FI.I (b)(3)(A) applies where a defendant misrepresents to the public that he was conducting the
bingo games wholly on behalf of the charitable organization, when, in fact, he was acting in part
for himself and his fellow deputies in skimming the charitable proceeds), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
137 (1994).
275. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b)(l)-(2) (providing a downward adjustment for an offender's acceptance of responsibility).
276. 63 F.3d 952 (10th Cir. 1995).
277. Ortiz, 63 F.3d at 953.
278. Id. at 955.
279. Id.
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offense." ° Pursuant to that section, an offender assists authorities by: "(1)
timely providing complete information to the government concerning his own
involvement in the offense; or (2) timely notifying authorities of his intention
to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing
for trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently." '8
Application note three provides that the commencement of trial precludes
the application of section 3E1.1(b)(2). 282 The Tenth Circuit determined that
the commencement of trial, which renders a guilty plea "untimely" under
section 3El.1(b)(2), does not affect the "timeliness" of complete information
under section 3E1.l(b)(1). 3 Subsection (1) and subsection (2) are
disjunctive; 24 as a result, the Tenth Circuit stated that "language referencing
the commencement of trial applies only to section 3El.1(b)(2)."' t Therefore,
the commencement of trial precludes application of a sentence reduction under
section 3El.1(b)(2) but does not likewise prevent the application of section
286
3E.l(b)(1).

B. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's holding is consistent with the First, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits' holdings in United States v. Tallandino,287 United States v.
Tello, 28 and United States v.

Stoops,

289

respectively. Generally,

conduct

qualifying for a sentencing reduction under subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) occurs
during the investigation into the instant offense. 2 ° Section 3E1.3(b) recognizes "society's legitimate social interest" in defendants who accept responsibility

280. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).
281. Id.
282. U.S.S.G. § 3El, comment. (n.3). Application Note 3 provides:
Entry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined with truthfully
admitting the conduct comprising the offense of conviction, and truthfully admitting or
not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which he is accountable under
§lBI.3 (Relevant Conduct) (see Application Note l(a)), will constitute significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility for the purposes of subsection (a). However, this
evidence may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with such
acceptance of responsibility. A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an
adjustment under this section as a matter of right.
Id.
283. Ortiz, 63 F.3d at 956.
284. Id.; U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)(1), (2) (allowing a reduction for "(1) timely providing complete
information to the government concerning his own involvement in the offense; or (2) timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to
avoid preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently").
285. Ortiz, 63 F.3d at 956.
286. Id.
287. 38 F.3d 1255 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that § 3El.l(b)(1) and § 3El.l(b)(2) are disjunctive).
288. 9 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that the commencement of trial only precludes an
application of § 3El.1(b)(2)).
289. 25 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the language referencing the commencement of
trial applies only to § 3E1.l(b)(2)).
290. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (nn.1-6).
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for their actions, the government's need to avoid making trial preparations,
and the court's reduction of the number of cases on court dockets.2 9,
A sentencing court can apply section 3E1.3(b) in conjunction with section
3E1.3(a).292 Subsection (a) provides a two-level reduction for offenders who
"clearly demonstrate acceptance of responsibility. 293 Application note 1(b)
to subsection (a) provides several examples of conduct which indicate a clear
acceptance of responsibility, including: "a voluntary payment of restitution
prior to the adjudication of guilt"; "a voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after the commission of the offense"; or "a voluntary termination or with'
drawal from criminal conduct."294
295
APPLIES
DECISIONS ADDRESSING WHETHER SECTION 4A1.2(D)(2)(A)
TO A JUVENILE PLACED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE STATE SECRETARY OF

IX.

SOCIAL SERVICES

A. United States v. Birch

2

1

1. Facts
In Birch, the defendant received a sentence for committing a violent crime
while possessing a firearm. 297 The trial court assessed two criminal history
levels for each of the defendant's two prior juvenile convictions pursuant to
section 4A1.2(d)(2)(A).298 The defendant served his juvenile convictions in
the custody of the State Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services. 2
The defendant appealed on the grounds that the trial court improperly imposed
a two-level enhancement under section 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) rather than a one-level
enhancement pursuant to section 4A1.2(d)(2)(B). 3"
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit decided that section 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) requires the imposition of a two-level criminal history adjustment for each juvenile or adult
"sentence of 'confinement' of at least sixty days.""'' Section 4AI.2(d)(2)(B)
provides a one-point criminal history adjustment for a "juvenile sentence imposed within five years to the defendant's commencement of the instant offense."3"2 Subsection (B) does not require the existence of a period of

291. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.6).
292. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.l(b).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History).
296. 39 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 1994).
297. Birch, 39 F.3d at 1090.
298. Id. at 1095. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(a) applies a two-level enhancement for each adult or

juvenile sentence resulting in a "confinement" that exceeds 60 days. Johnson contested the court's
determination that placement into the custody of the state secretary of Social and Rehabilitation
Services constitutes a "confinement" within the purview of the guideline section. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 4AI.2(d)(2)(A).
302.

U.S.S.G. § 4A.2(d)(2)(b).
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"confinement."3 3 The propriety of the trial court's application of subsection
(A) depends on whether an offender's commitment to the custody of a state
juvenile authority constituted a "confinement."3 °4 The commentary to section
4A1.2(d)(2)(A), however, fails to define the term "confinement.""3 5 The
Tenth Circuit held that confinement includes a commitment to the custody of a
state juvenile authority within the scope of section 4A1.2(d)(2)(A), and affirmed the trial court's sentencing determination. 3°
B. Analysis
Guideline sections 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) and (B) provide enhancements for both
an offender's adult and juvenile convictions.307 Section 4A1.2(d) limits the
use of juvenile convictions. 38 A sentencing court may only consider an
offense committed prior to age eighteen that resulted in the imposition of an
adult sentence of imprisonment exceeding thirteen months. 3' Additionally, a
sentencing court may not count juvenile or adult offenses occurring more than
five years prior to the commencement of the instant offense. 30 These limitations were designed in part to "avoid large sentencing disparities resulting
from the differential availability" of juvenile records among jurisdictions.3'
C. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit's holding is consistent with the Sixth Circuit's holdings
in United States v. Hanley1 2 and United States v. Kirby,"3 and with the
Eleventh Circuit's holding in United States v. Fuentes."4 In each of these
decisions, the offender's criminal history also included a juvenile conviction
for which a state agency obtained custody of the offender.3 5
CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion demonstrates the complexity of applying the
Guidelines' determinative sentencing scheme. Perhaps the complexity explains
the pervasive nature of Guidelines issues on the Tenth Circuit's docket sheets.

303. Birch, 39 F.3d at 1095.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.2(d)(2)(A), (B).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. 906 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir.) (concluding that the term "confinement" in § 4A1.2(d)(2)(a)
included placement into custody of the state's juvenile authority), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 945
(1990).
313. 893 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that commitment to the custody of the state's
juvenile authority constitutes a "confinement" under U.S.S.G. §4Al.2(d)(2)(a).
314. 991 F.2d 700 (11 th Cir. 1993) (finding that the defendant's commitment to a state juvenile authority in excess of 60 days was a "confinement").
315. Birch, 39 F.3d 1095; see Fuentes, 991 F.2d at 202; Hanley, 906 F.2d at 119; Kirby, 893
F.2d at 868.
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The Tenth Circuit continues to struggle with the Guidelines as the Sentencing
Commission continually adopts new amendments and as factual scenarios not
contemplated by the Guidelines arise.
In the face of this uncertainty, the Tenth Circuit has generally adopted an
extremely restrictive interpretation of Guideline principles. Perhaps, the only
Frazier1 6
exceptions to this conclusion are the Tenth Circuit's holdings in
and Gonzalez," 7 where the Tenth Circuit abandoned its strict reliance on the
plain language of the Guidelines and opted for a more liberal reading of the
guideline provisions.
David A. Forkner

316. United States v. Frazier, 53 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Frazier, see
supra text accompanying notes 255-74.
317. United States v. Gonzales, 65 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1995). For a further discussion of
Gonzales, see supra text accompanying notes 234-52.
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SENTENCING TABLE
(in months of imprisonment)
Criminal History Category
Offense
Level

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

1

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

2

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

1-7

3a

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

2-8

4

0-6

0-6

0-6

2-8

4-10

5

0-6

0-6

1-7

4-10

6-12

9-15

6

0-6

1-7

2-8

6-12

9-15

12-18

7

0-6

2-8

4-10

8-14

12-18

15-21

8b

0-6

4-10

6-12

10-16

15-21

18-24

9

4-10

6-12

8-14

12-18

18-24

21-27

lOc

6-12

8-14

10-16

15-21

21-27

24-30

I

8-14

10-16

12-18

18-24

24-30

27-33

21-27

27-33

30-37

3-9
6-12

12

10-16

12-18

15-21

13

12-18

15-21

18-24

24-30

30-37

33-41

14

15-21

18-24

21-27

27-33

33-41

37-46

15

18-24

21-27

24-30

30-37

37-46

41-51

16

21-27

24-30

27-33

33-41

41-51

46-57

17

24-30

27-33

30-37

37-46

46-57

51-63

18

27-33

30-37

33-41

41-51

51-63

57-71

19

30-37

33-41

37-46

46-57

57-71

63-78

20

33-41

37-46

41-51

51-63

63-78

70-87

21

37-46

41-51

46-57

57-71

70-87

77-96

22

41-51

46-57

51-63

63-78

77-96

84-105

23

46-57

51-63

57-71

70-87

84-105

92-115

24

51-63

57-71

63-78

77-96

92-115

100-125

25

57-71

63-78

70-87

84-105

100-125

110-137

110-137

120-150

26

63-78

70-87

78-97

92-115

87-108

100-125

120-150

130-162

27

70-87

78-97

28

78-97

87-108

92-121

110-137

130-162

140-175

29

87-108

97-121

108-135

121-151

140-175

151-188
168-210

30

97-121

108-135

121-151

135-168

151-188

151-188

168-210

188-235

31

108-135

121-151

135-168

32

121-151

135-168

151-188

168-210

188-235

210-262

33

135-168

151-188

168-210

188-235

210-262

235-293

34

151-188

168-210

188-235

210-262

235-293

262-327

35

168-210

188-235

210-262

235-293

262-327

292-365

36

188-235

210-262

235-293

262-327

292-365

324-405

37

210-262

235-293

262-327

292-365

324-405

360-life

38

235-293

262-327

292-365

324-405

360-life

360-life

39

262-327

292-365

324-405

360-life

360-life

360-life

40

292-365

324-405

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

41

324-405

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

42

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

360-life

43

life

life

life

life

life

life

a. Probation available (see U.S.S.G. § 5Bl.1(aX).
b. Probation with conditions of confinement available (see U.S.S.G. § SB.l(a)(2)).
c. New "split sentence" available (see U.S.S.G. §§ 5C .(c)(3), (d)(2)).

